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PUTTING FLESH ON THE BONES OF UNITED STATES V.
WINANS: PRIVATE PARTY LIABILITY UNDER
TREATIES THAT RESERVE ACTUAL FISH FOR THE
TRIBAL TAKING
Lindsay Halm
Abstract: One hundred years ago, in United States v. Winans, the United States Supreme
Court announced that private parties are subject to the rights reserved by Indians under
treaty. Accordingly, tribes enforce their treaty fishing rights in federal court to halt private
and government actions that threaten to impair their reserved right to take a fair portion of
fish from usual and accustomed fishing stations. In addition to injunctive relief, federal
courts may award monetary relief to tribes where Congress limits the treaty fishing right. In
general, monetary relief is a remedy against any defendant actor who impairs non-fishing
treaty-reserved rights. Furthermore, courts have long awarded damages to commercial fishers
for interference with their vocational rights. Courts in the Ninth Circuit, however, have
denied monetary relief to tribes when private projects destroy the treaty right to take fish.
This Comment argues that courts should award damages to tribes when private projects
proximately cause harm to a tribe's right to take actual fish.
The right to resort to the fishing places.., was a part of larger
rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there
was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere
they breathed.'
The right to harvest fish is central to many tribes' existence, culture,
and welfare. It has existed from time immemorial and continues into
perpetuity.3 Notwithstanding the reservation of fishing rights under
treaties with the United States, the federal government has listed
numerous fish species as threatened or endangered 4  under the
1. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
2. See id.; see also Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 664-69 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel] (discussing the historical significance of fish
to tribes for religious rites, subsistence, and commercial purposes).
3. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667 (interpreting the Yakima Tribe's understanding that they
"would forever be able to continue" fishing practices under treaty).
4. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon
Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs) in Washington and Oregon, and Endangered Status for One
Chinook Salmon ESU in Washington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14308-01 (1999) (listing the Puget Sound,
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Endangered Species Act 5 following decades of habitat destruction, dam
building, and over-fishing.6 For example, the Columbia River salmon
runs, once the largest in the world, have diminished by seventy-five to
eighty-five percent due to the dozens of dams that currently impede fish
passage. Despite successful suits by Northwest Tribes to secure a fair
portion-up to fifty percent-of the available harvest,8 various fish
species continue to decline rapidly, which might suggest that a fair
portion of what is available today may soon be worthless.9 Said another
way, the right to half of zero ... is still zero.
Federal courts, however, must reconcile the dire warning that tribal
fishing rights are doomed to nothingness with precedent that
contemplates actual fish'0 for the tribal taking." One hundred years ago,
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Winans12 declared
that private landowners are subject to the treaty fishing right and that
accommodation is required to ensure continuing exercise of that right.
13
Failure to uphold the treaty right, the Court stated, results in "an
impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to
promise more and give the word of the Nation for more. ,14
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has likened Indian treaties to
Upper Willamette spring-run, and Lower Columbia River evolutionarily significant units (ESUs) of
chinook salmon as threatened, and the Columbia River spring-run chinook ESU as endangered);
Endangered and Threatened Species: Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Chum Salmon in
Washington and Oregon, 64 Fed. Reg. 14508 (1998) (listing Hood Canal summer-run and Columbia
River ESUs of chum salmon as threatened); National Marine Fisheries Service, Federal Register
Notices (listing federal register notices for anadromous fish species), at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesafedreg.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2004).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1533 (2002).
6. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST 3 14 (1996) (summarizing the "salmon problem" in the Pacific Northwest and the
factors contributing to species decline).
7. See Northwest Res. Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1375 76
(9th Cir. 1994) (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 14055, 14058 (1991)).
8. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685 86.
9. See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1356 57 (9th Cir. 1985) (vacating a portion
of the district court opinion on the "environmental issue" that declared that the right to take fish
necessarily includes the right to have those fish protected from man-made despoliation).
10. "Actual fish" refers to tangible fish that, reduced to possession, can be used to sustain the
needs of a given tribe. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678; Northwest Res., 35 F.3d at 1377.
12. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
13. Id. at 380 81.
14. Id. at 380.
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contracts between sovereigns, 5 only Congress has the power to limit
rights contained therein. 16 Thus, government'1 and private projects 8 that
threaten a tribe's exercise of fishing rights reserved under treaty cannot
proceed without express authorization from Congress.' 9 In recent
decades, federal courts have enjoined both governmental and private
projects to protect tribes' right to harvest fish. 20 Treaty tribes have also
secured monetary relief where Congress has limited, or abrogated,
fishing rights reserved under treaty. Similarly, where private or
government actors interfere with other treaty-reserved rights, such as
land or mineral rights, courts grant monetary relief to tribes. In
contrast, courts within the Ninth Circuit have rejected monetary relief
for the impairment of treaty fishing rights by private projects.23
This Comment argues that courts should award monetary relief to
tribes when private parties impair tribal treaty rights to take actual fish.24
As Winans and its progeny indicate, Indian treaties operate as a
preexisting legal condition on the landscape, which binds the federal
15. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675.
16. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
17. See Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553,
555 56 (D. Or. 1977) (issuing declaratory relief against a federal project).
18. Winans, 198 U.S. at 380 (enjoining a private project); Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp
1504, 1517 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (same). Because the federal government is the only party that
maintains a special trust relationship with tribes, the term "private" in this Comment refers to any
non-federal projects, including those of municipal corporations.
19. See infra Part II.A (discussing case law that awards relief to tribes in the absence of
congressional authorization).
20. See Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515,
1522 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1523; No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp.
334, 372 (W.D. Wash. 1981); Umatilla, 440 F. Supp. at 556.
21. See Menominee, 391 U.S. at 412 13.
22. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985) (affirming tribe's
claim for damages based on state and county governments' unlawful possession of land); United
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (upholding an award for just compensation for
unlawful takings of timber and mineral resources); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103,
111 (1935) (upholding an award of just compensation for unlawful takings of land by the federal
government); Pueblo of Isleta v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 570 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1978)
(remanding for trial on the issue of damages for trespass from blasting activities of a private
company).
23. See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (W.D. Wash.
2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part by 332 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2003), and vacated by 358 F.3d 1180
(9th Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc); Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791,
818 19 (D. Idaho 1994).
24. See infra Part IV.
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government, states, and private citizens. 25 Tribes currently may assert
their fishing right before a private party proceeds with project
construction; 26 tribes should also be able to seek monetary relief in
federal courts after private parties implement harmful projects.2 When a
private project violates a treaty, a court should make the tribe whole by
awarding monetary relief as calculated by the proximately caused loss of
a fair portion of the fish harvest.
28
Part I of this Comment reviews the scope and enforceability of treaty
fishing rights. Part II discusses the relief granted when governmental and
private parties interfere with fishing and other rights reserved under
treaty. Part III examines claims for monetary relief against private
parties who interfere with fishing rights within the Ninth Circuit. Lastly,
Part IV argues that United States v. Winans and its progeny reserve
actual fish for the tribal taking; thus, where private parties harm this
right, courts should award monetary relief to make a tribe whole.
I. BY TREATY, TRIBES RESERVED THE RIGHT TO ACCESS
USUAL AND ACCUSTOMED PLACES AND TAKE FISH
Occupying a unique niche in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence,
Indian treaties trigger rules of construction that unmistakably favor tribal
rights.29 To date, the Court has interpreted the fishing clause that appears
in several Pacific Northwest treaties to include both a tribal right to
access "usual and accustomed places" and a "right of taking fish" in
common with other nontreaty citizens.30 Neither governmental 3' nor
25. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391
U.S. 392, 397 (1968) (citing Winans, 198 U.S. at 381); Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 659 (1979)
(citing Winans, 198 U.S. at 381).
26. See Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515,
1522 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (W.D. Wash. 1988); No
Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 373 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. See infra Part IV.B; see also Memorandum from the Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to
Solicitor 1 (May 25, 1982) (outlining elements of fish damage claims against private parties).
29. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431 32
(1943).
30. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 674 (discussing the right of taking fish); Seufert Bros. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 194, 199 (1919) (discussing the right of access); Winans, 198 U.S. at 384
(discussing both the right of access and the right of taking fish).
31. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (stating that a treaty fishing
right "may, of course, not be qualified by the State"); Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian
Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D. Or. 1977).
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private parties 32 have authority to limit treaty fishing rights; only
Congress can abrogate or modify the terms.33
A. Federal Courts Liberally Construe Treaties that Reserve Tribal
Fishing Rights
When tribes granted land to the United States by treaty, they reserved
the traditional right to hunt and fish.34 For example, each of the nine
Stevens Treaties of the Washington territory read, with scant variation:
"[t]he right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with all citizens of the Territory ... [is secured to said Indians]. ' 35
Tribes in other parts of the country similarly reserved in their respective
treaties the right to hunt and fish.36 Indeed, these historic rights persist,
even if not explicitly stated under treaty.
To determine the scope of rights contained in Indian treaties, the U.S.
Supreme Court employs unique canons of construction to account for the
circumstances of historical treaty negotiations. 38 The canons instruct
courts to construe terms liberally in favor of establishing Indian rights,39
resolve ambiguities in favor of protecting tribal interests,40 and interpret
provisions as Indians would have naturally understood them at the time
of the treaty's signing.4 1 Though the full scope of treaty fishing rights
32. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 384; Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1514 (W.D. Wash.
1988) ("The federal, City and private defendants here do not have the ability to qualify or limit the
Tribes' geographical treaty fishing right.").
33. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 73840 (1986); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 565 66 (1903) (noting that Congress's abrogation of Indian treaty rights derives from a long-
standing plenary power over Indian affairs).
34. Winans, 198 U.S. at 377 78 (quoting from the Yakima Treaty); id. at 381 ("[T]he treaty was
not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them a reservation of those not
granted.").
35. Id. at 378.
36. See, e.g., Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 853 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (D.
Minn. 1994) (interpreting a treaty guaranteeing "the privilege of hunting, fishing and gathering the
wild rice upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded"), aff'd, 124 F.3d
904 (8th Cir. 1997), and aff'd, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
37. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405 06 (1968).
38. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
423,431 32(1943).
39. See Choctaw, 318 U.S. at 431 32.
40. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564, 576 77 (1908).
41. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676 (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).
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remains untested,42 the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a "broad gloss"
on tribal fishing rights.43
B. Federal Courts Recognize Two Treaty-Reserved Rights: The Right
to Access Usual and Accustomed Places and the Right to Take Fish
Indian treaty fishing rights include a "geographic right," or the right
to access "usual and accustomed grounds and stations," both on and off
reservation land.44 In the 1905 landmark Winans case, the U.S. Supreme
Court first construed the scope of the access right against a private
party.45 The Winans, upstream landowners, held claim to shore land
along the Columbia River under patents from the United States.46 The
Court interpreted the Yakima Treaty as running against the United States
and its grantees; the treaty therefore survives the subsequent private
acquisition of federal lands.4 The Court reasoned that the right to access
fishing stations established in the land an easement-a "servitude upon
every piece of land"-enabling the Tribe's continual exercise of its
42. See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (vacating part of the
district court opinion because of insufficient factual support for declaratory judgment that the right
to take fish necessarily includes the right to have those fish protected from man-made despoliation).
The scope of the treaty fishing right remains uncertain in the Ninth Circuit following United States
v. Washington; several commentators have argued for an expansive reading of treaty rights on
various theories. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit
and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV.
407, 412 (1998) (arguing that courts should consider that the treaty fishing right includes a "habitat
right"); 0. Yale Lewis III, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right as Part of the Trinity of Rights
Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 281, 304-11 (2002
03) (arguing that courts should consider that the treaty fishing right includes a "habitat right"); Brian
J. Perron, Note, When Tribal Treaty Fishing Rights Become a Mere Opportunity to Dip One's Net
into the Water and Pull It out Empty: The Case for Money Damages when Treaty-Reserved Fish
Habitat Is Degraded, 25 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 783, 799 803 (2001) (arguing that
courts should provide a remedy for habitat destruction); Allen H. Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty
Fisheries: A Violation of Tribal Property Rights?, 17 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 153, 154
(1996) (arguing that the treaty fishing right is a compensable property interest); Mary Christina
Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part II): Asserting a Sovereign Servitude to
Protect Habitat of Imperiled Species, 25 VT. L. REV. 355, 359 (2001) (arguing that tribes maintain a
property right as a sovereign entity to protect habitat).
43. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679.
44. See Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 199 (1919); United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 381 82 (1905). Hereinafter, the term "usual and accustomed places," as it appears in the
Stevens Treaties, is referred to as either "fishing stations" or "historic grounds."
45. Winans, 198 U.S. at 371.
46. Id. at 379.
47. Id. at 381 82.
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right.48
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the treaty fishing
clause to include a separate-but-related "right to take fish., 4 9 In Winans,
farmers had obtained a license from the State of Washington to operate
fish wheels, contraptions that effectively gave them exclusive possession
of the fishery.50 The Court rejected the argument that Indian treaty rights
could be excluded by a state-licensed device and remanded the case to
determine an appropriate "adjustment and accommodation" of the
harvest between the Winans and the Yakimas.5
In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n,52 the Court held that the right to take fish in common with
all citizens of the Territory reserved to tribes up to fifty percent of the
total harvest. 53 In a six-to-three decision, the Fishing Vessel majority
construed the fishing right in no uncertain terms: "In our view, the
purpose and language of the treaties are unambiguous; they secure the
Indians' right to take a share of each run of fish that passes through tribal
fishing areas."54 Citing undisputed evidence of historically abundant and
reliable fish runs, the Court concluded that both parties to the treaty had
no doubt that the signatory Indians would continue to take as many fish
as they needed.5 5 Indeed, the Tribes assented to cede and peacefully
grant millions of acres of land precisely because Washington Territory
Governor Stevens recognized that the Tribes reserved, into perpetuity,
life-sustaining fish.56 Governor Stevens avowed to the signatory Tribes,
"[t]his paper secures your fish.",5 7
The Court held that the treaties secured a tribal catch as necessary to
48. Id. at 381,384.
49. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 674 (1979); Winans, 198 U.S. at 382, 384.
50. Winans, 198 U.S. at 382.
51. Id. at 382, 384.
52. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
53. Id. at 686 88; see also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343-48 (W.D. Wash.
1974) [hereinafter Boldt] (holding that treaty tribes are entitled to a fair portion of the harvestable
fish), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). The case is uniformly referred to as the "Boldt" decision
in reference to the name of the federal district court judge who authored the opinion. See Ed
Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal
Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279, 289 n. 42 (2000).
54. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679.
55. Id. at 675 76.
56. See id. at 667, 675 77.
57. See id. at 667 n.il.
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provide for a livelihood or "moderate living., 58 In doing so, the Court
summarily rejected the State and commercial fishers' assertion that the
"in common with" clause of the treaty promised only equal opportunity
to fish.5 9 An equal opportunity fishing right, which resulted in the
Tribes' paltry two percent of the catch prior to Fishing Vessel, was not
only categorically inadequate, but a derision of treaty negotiations that
reserved to Tribes a meaningful compensation for the millions of acres
they peacefully ceded.60 Moreover, the Court reasoned that it was
inconceivable that either party would have agreed to crowd the Tribes
out of their fishing rights to accommodate future settlers. 61 Hence, the
Court interpreted the intent of the signatory parties as reserving to the
Tribes an enforceable right to "take" an actual, fair portion of fish, not
"merely the chance, shared with millions of other citizens, occasionally
to dip their nets. 62 The commercial harvest allocation was reasoned to
subsume the Tribes' existing ceremonial and subsistence needs, though
the Court recognized the possibility that future adjustment would be
required if the fifty-percent divide did not accommodate such
63purposes.
C. Federal Courts Enforce Treaty Fishing Rights Against
Governmental and Private Parties
Neither private parties nor government actors may undertake actions
that reduce or eliminate a tribe's treaty fishing right.64 Indeed, a court's
limitation of a treaty right is reversible error.65 Congress alone has the
58. Id. at 670 71, 686-88.
59. Id. at 676 78.
60. Id. at 676 77 n.22.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 678 79.
63. Id. at 688 ("We need not now decide whether priority for such ceremonial and subsistence
uses would be required in a period of short supply in order to carry out the purposes of the treaty.").
64. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (stating the treaty fishing right
"may, of course, not be qualified by the state"); Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp 1504, 1514
(W.D. Wash. 1988) ("[T]he federal, City and private defendants here do not have the ability to
qualify or limit the Tribes' geographical fishing right (or to allow this to occur through permits) by
eliminating a portion of an Indian fishing ground for a purpose other than conservation.").
65. See United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 650 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing trial court
decision where the lower court had improperly limited the treaty right); Cree v. Waterbury, 78 F.3d
1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996) (remanding for a full investigation into the historical context at the time
of treaty signing where the district court had summarily assumed a treaty highway right as
analogous to a previously litigated fishing right).
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power to abrogate or limit treaty fishing rights.66 Moreover, Congress's
abrogation of a treaty fishing right must be express and specific.6 The
only exception to the rule is a narrow one in which states may issue
neutral regulations pursuant to a "conservation necessity.
' 61
Even if Congress approves funding for a government project, such
approval does not amount to express abrogation of the treaty right. 69 For
example, in Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v.
Alexander, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon refused to
infer congressional abrogation from general project authorization, and
granted declaratory relief to the Tribes.71 The court found that, if
constructed, the federal agency's dam would prevent wild fish from
swimming upstream to spawn and would destroy access to some of the
Tribes' fishing stations by flooding them with up to two hundred feet of
72
water. Because Congress had authorized the dam without apparent
knowledge of such impacts, the federal agency's action constituted an
unauthorized, actual taking of fishing rights. 3 Notably, the dam was
never constructed .
Just as federal projects cannot qualify a tribe's treaty fishing right, the
Fishing Vessel Court echoed, in accord with Puyallup Tribe v.
Department of Game, that governments cannot regulate away treaty
76
rights . Because the salmon harvest proved at once lucrative and
diminishing, state agencies leading up to Fishing Vessel attempted to
exclude tribal fishers through regulations that favored non-Indian
66. See Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553, 555
(D. Or. 1977) (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)).
Abrogation occurs where Congress expressly legislates to eradicate or otherwise alter the terms of a
treaty. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 39 (1986) (requiring express abrogation
of possessory land title); Boldt, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that "[o]nce a tribe is
determined to be a party to a treaty, its rights under that treaty may be lost only by unequivocal
action of Congress").
67. Umatilla, 440 F. Supp. at 555 (citing Menominee, 391 U.S. at 413).
68. See Puyallup, 391 U.S. at 398.
69. See Umatilla, 440 F. Supp. at 555.
70. 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977).
71. Id. at 555 (citing Menominee, 391 U.S. at 413).
72. Id. at 555 56.
73. Id.
74. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 42, at 465.
75. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
76. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 681 82 (citing Puyallup, 391 U.S. at 398).
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commercial operations." Tribal members who exercised their treaty
rights were subject to harassment, violence, and often arrest in an all-out
"fish war." '8 Though the Tribes prevailed in federal court, 9 the
Washington State Supreme Court, employing its own interpretation of
the area's historic Indian treaties, upheld state regulations in defiance of
federal orders.80 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the majority and
dissenting justices agreed that it is the federal courts' duty and province
to construe an Indian treaty. 81
In sustaining federal jurisdiction in Fishing Vessel, the Court enforced
the treaty fishing right against the state and against private party
fishers. 82 The enforceability of treaties against private parties, however,
long predates Fishing Vessel.83 Summarizing the relevant precedent,84
the Fishing Vessel Court recognized that it stood on the shoulders of
United States v. Winans: "The purport of our cases is clear. Nontreaty
fishermen may not rely on property law concepts, devices such as the
fish wheel, license fees, or general regulations to deprive the Indians of a
fair share of the relevant runs of anadromous fish in the case area." 85 In
Winans, the private farmers could not employ an absolute land title or a
state fish wheel license to trump the Yakima Tribe's treaty rights.
86
Instead, the Winans's exercise of rights was "subject to the treaty" just
77. See id. at 669 74; Puyallup, 391 U.S. at 398 (rejecting a state's attempt to qualify or limit the
treaty fishing right, except by conservation necessity); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684
(1942) (rejecting a state's attempt to charge a license fee as an unlawful limitation of the treaty
fishing right).
78. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 674; Perron, supra note 42, at 792 n.69 (citing Alex Tizon, 25
Years After the Boldt Decision-the Fish Tale that Changed History, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999,
at A1).
79. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1129 30 (W.D. Wash. 1978), afT'd, 573
F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding federal district court orders in the face of state regulations);
Boldt, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (holding that treaty Tribes are entitled to a fair
portion of the harvestable fish), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d
276, 285 86, 571 P.2d 1373, 1378 (1977).
81. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 693 96; id. at 707 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, if it
were necessary to construe the treaties to produce these results, it would be our duty so to construe
them.").
82. See id. at 676 77.
83. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 384 (1905).
84. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679 85 (citing, inter alia, Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391
U.S. 392, 398 (1968); Winans, 198 U.S. at 380, 384).
85. Id. at 684.
86. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, 384.
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as it was "to the other laws of the land."817 Similarly, in Muckleshoot v.
Hall,88 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
reasoned that permitting the private project at issue would, in effect,
determine the "time and manner of [tribal] fishing" and the "size of the
take"-a power reserved to Congress and, more narrowly, to states
regulating under a conservation necessity.89 Thus, the court summarized,
"[t]he federal, City and private defendants here do not have the ability to
qualify or limit the Tribes' geographical treaty fishing right (or to allow
this to occur through permits) by eliminating a portion of an Indian
fishing ground."90
In sum, courts liberally construe treaty fishing rights by interpreting
treaties in favor of tribal interests. 91 Courts reject arguments that
interpret fishing rights as a mere opportunity to pursue a catch; rather,
treaties reserve to tribes the right to access all historic grounds in order
to take a fair portion of the harvest from historic stations.9 2 The U.S.
Supreme Court has determined that the fifty-percent apportionment to
tribes and the accompanying easement are consistent with treaty
negotiations that guarantee continuing cultural and economic vitality.93
As a consequence, courts enforce the treaty fishing right against states,
the federal government, and private parties.
94
II. TRIBES SECURE INJUNCTIVE AND MONETARY RELIEF
TO PROTECT TREATY RIGHTS IN FEDERAL COURT
Tribes secure injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court to
defend their treaty fishing rights against governmental and private
projects that, if developed, would interfere with the exercise of fishing
rights.95 Additionally, because the treaty fishing right includes a property
interest, courts award tribes just compensation where Congress
87. Id. at 382.
88. 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
89. Id. at 1512 (citing Puyallup, 391 U.S. at 398).
90. Id. at 1514.
91. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
423,431 32(1943).
92. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686 88.
93. Id.
94. See Puyallup, 391 U.S. at 398; Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1514.
95. See Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1517 (securing injunctive relief against a private project);
Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553, 555 56 (D. Or.
1977) (securing declaratory relief against a federal project).
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abrogates a fishing right.96 Other rights secured under treaty are likewise
entitled to monetary relief, whether interference with that right results
from federal government taking, state interference,9 8 or private party
action. 99 Moreover, courts have long afforded monetary relief to non-
Indian fishers at common law. 100
A. Federal Courts Enjoin Any Project that Threatens a Tribe's Treaty
Fishing Right
Like treaties with foreign nations, Indian treaties operate as the
supreme law of the land. 1 1 Consequently, absent express congressional
enactment dictating otherwise, courts enjoin private 1 2 and government
projects i03 that, if constructed, would impair treaty fishing rights. Indeed,
projects must comply with treaties as they must with other federal and
state laws. 104
Courts consider any limitation on a tribe's treaty fishing right
sufficient grounds for halting the permitting process or denying permits
altogether to government and private parties. 105 For example, even
though the government project in Umatilla included proposed mitigation
efforts to trap and haul chinook salmon from below the proposed dam,
the project could not proceed without express congressional action
because access to a steelhead fishery would be eliminated.1 6 Likewise,
96. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
97. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 98 (1937).
98. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985).
99. See Pueblo of Isleta v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 570 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1978);
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Co., 503 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1974).
100. See Columbia River Fishermen v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195, 197 98 (Or. 1939).
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); see also Settler v. Lameer,
507 F.2d 231, 238 n.16 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The various Indian treaties constitute the Supreme Law of
the Land. Upon entering the union, the State of Washington and all other states were bound by those
treaties.") (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 33 (1920)).
102. See Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp 1504, 1517 (W.D. Wash. 1988); No Oilport! v.
Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 373 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
103. See Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553,
555 (D. Or. 1977) (granting declaratory relief against a federal project).
104. See Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1516; see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379
(1905) (holding that absolute land title did not insulate defendants from treaty enforcement).
105. See Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp.
1515, 1522 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (upholding the Corps' decision to deny private party's permit);
Umatilla, 440 F. Supp. at 555 56 (issuing declaratory relief).
106. Umatilla, 440 F. Supp. at 555.
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in Northwest Sea Farms v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,0 7
the district court rejected the justification that a proposed private fish
farm would have only a de minimis effect on the Lummi Tribe's rights
where the Indian fishers could still harvest fish at other stations. 10 8 The
site did not need to be the most primary or most productive; rather, the
court reasoned that access to all usual and accustomed fishing stations
was reserved under treaty. 10 9 Similarly, in Muckleshoot v. Hall, though
the Tribes could continue to catch the same fair portion of fish at stations
outside of the proposed private project area, the district court denied an
injunction against the tribe based, in part, on evidence that the Tribes
would have to expend more money and time to catch "the same number
of fish." 110
Because treaties operate as an independent source of federal law, a
tribe's fishing right can serve as the sole ground on which a federal
agency may deny a project permit."' For example, in Northwest Sea
Farms, the district court upheld a federal agency's determination that
denied a permit to the fish farm on the basis that it would impede the
Lummi Tribe's treaty-reserved right to access historic fishing stations.
1 12
The court specifically refused to defer to an earlier state administrative
proceeding that, if binding on the district court, would unilaterally
extinguish a treaty right by means of a permitting process, rather than
through congressional enactment.113
Adherence to other federal or state laws does not indicate that a
project complies with relevant Indian treaties. 114 For example, the
107. 931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
108. Id. at 1522.
109. Id. at 1521.
110. Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
111. See Northwest Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1522.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1523 n.8. It should also be noted that statutory causes of action are not dispositive of
treaty claims unless a comprehensive statute "speaks directly" to the question of remedies for treaty
right impairment. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985) (citing
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981)). Likewise, where Congress does not authorize an
administrative agency to award monetary compensation for past or present injury to a tribe, the fact
that an agency reviews the impact of a contested project does not preempt a tribe's claim for
monetary relief in federal court. See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791, 800-01
(D. Idaho 1994) ("FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] did not, and indeed could not,
order monetary compensation for past or present injury to the fish runs .... Such an action is
properly brought in the courts, not before FERC.").
114. See Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1516; see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379
(1905) (holding that absolute land title did not insulate defendants from treaty enforcement).
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federal district court in Muckleshoot enforced the Muckleshoot and
Suquamish Tribes' treaty rights, even though the proposed private
marina contractors conducted an extensive environmental review,
procured long-sought-after federal and local permits, and would face
significant financial harm. 115 The Tribes sued the City of Seattle, the
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), and a private developer to enjoin
construction of a marina sited atop an historic fishing station just north
of the already densely developed Seattle waterfront. 16 The Corps
estimated the Tribes' financial losses at between $9335 and $40,000; the
Tribes calculated the potential loss to Indian fishers as over $255,000
annually, which accounted for impacts of the marina itself"117 Resting its
decision to grant injunctive relief solely on the possibility of irreparable
injury to the treaty right, the court did not reach the federal statutory
claims alleged under the National Environmental Policy Act." 8 The
treaty fishing right alone provided grounds to enjoin the private
project. 119
Similarly, in No Oilport! v. Carter,120 the district court granted the
Tribes' request for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a private
company's proposed oil pipeline would proximately cause a decline in
the "size or quality" of the fish run. 12 1 Granting summary judgment for
the defendant on all other statutory environmental claims, the court
characterized the Tribes' claims as "the most troublesome of all the
issues." 122
B. Federal Courts Award Monetary Relief Against the Federal
Government for Interference with the Treaty Fishing Right
In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,123 the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that a treaty reserves to tribes a fishing interest
equivalent to a bona fide property right. 124 In doing so, the Court held
115. Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1516.
116. Id. at 1505 06.
117. Id. at 1506.
118. Id. at 1517.
119. Id.
120. 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
121. Id. at 372.
122. Id. at371.
123. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
124. Id. at413.
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that the Menominees' treaty entitled the Tribe to just compensation for
any unlawful taking by the federal government. 12 5 The Tribe's right
survived as a separate and cognizable property right despite
assimilationist legislation by Congress that had previously terminated
the Tribe's official status. 126 That is, even though Congress extinguished
the federal trust supervision of tribal property and services, the Court
refused to imply that the legislation likewise vanquished fishing and
hunting rights.'
2 7
Tribes have also secured monetary relief before the Indian Claims
Commission, which Congress established to vindicate Indian rights via a
waiver of U.S. sovereign immunity. 128 As in the proceedings leading up
to and affirmed by Menominee, for example, the Commission has
awarded compensation for abrogation of treaty fishing rights. 2 9 Short of
full abrogation, the Commission also awarded monetary relief for the
partial limitation of a treaty fishing right in Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation v. United States.130 In Colville, the Tribes brought
suit against the United States for authorizing dams and commercial
operations that depleted the on-reservation supply of fish.' 31 The
Commission granted compensation for the retail value of fish to which
the Tribe was entitled, less the value of fish actually received.
132
C. Federal Courts Award Monetary Relief Against Any Party that
Interferes with Other Rights Reserved Under Treaty
As with the treaty fishing right, tribes are entitled to just
compensation where the United States takes tribal property interests in
125. Id.
126. Id. at4ll 13.
127. Id.
128. See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. United States, 43 Indian Cl. Comm'n
505, 541 (1978); FELIx S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 161 62 (Rennard
Strickland ed., Michie Co. 1982) (1942) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
129. Menominee, 391 U.S. at 413 (1968), aff'g 388 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
130. 43 Indian Cl. Comm'n 505, 525 (1978).
131. Id.
132. Id. To be sure, if such judgments operate as a one-time buy out, tribes today would be
reluctant to assert similar claims in federal court. See State Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation
Irrigation Dist., 121 Wash. 2d 257, 291, 850 P.2d 1306, 1325 (1993) (holding Indian Claims
Commission final judgment barred the Yakima Indians from subsequently protecting their treaty
fishing rights under the doctrine of res judicata).
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land that are reserved under treaty or recognized by statute. 33 The
federal government may not take a tribe's treaty-reserved land by
appropriating title to third parties without payment to the tribe as if the
tribe owned the land in fee simple. 34 Compensation is likewise due for
federal taking of timber or mineral rights secured through the possessory
rights inherent in treaty-reserved land.
35
Federal courts also award monetary relief where state or local
governments interfere with treaty rights in land.' 36 For example, in
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,13 the Oneida Tribes sued the
New York counties of Oneida and Madison for damages, alleging
interference with their possessory right to occupy the area inhabited by
the county citizenry. 38 The U.S. Supreme Court sustained the Tribe's
common law trespass claim-although it arose 175 years prior139-as a
live federal issue and awarded damages to the Oneidas for the unlawful
possession by the Counties. 14 Against this backdrop, in United States v.
Pend Oreille Public Utility District No. 1,141 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained federal question jurisdiction 42
and remanded the case to determine the appropriate injunctive and
133. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 98 (1937); United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 11 (1935).
134. Tribes acquire property interests by treaty, aboriginal possession, executive order,
congressional establishment of Indian reservation, and other mechanisms. COHEN'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 128, at 471 86. Underlying these forms of property interests is the assumption that, by
virtue of discovery, the federal government holds land title in trust for tribes and thus retains legal
"ownership"; however, a tribe's right to "use" and "occupy" the land is exclusive and enforceable.
Id. at 523 28. For property guaranteed by treaty, tribes are entitled to just compensation for its
appropriation. See Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 111.
135. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 110 (stating that the power of the United States to control and
manage "did not enable the United States to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to
its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation for
them; for that would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation") (internal
citation omitted).
136. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985).
137. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
138. Id. at 229.
139. Id. at 241 ("We think the borrowing of a state limitations period in these cases would be
inconsistent with federal policy. Indeed, on a number of occasions Congress has made this clear
with respect to Indian land claims.").
140. Id. at 230.
141. 28 F.3d 1544 (9th Cir. 1994).
142. Id. at 1549 n.8 (noting that federal jurisdiction is not disputed). Though such disputes would
typically be relegated to state courts, federal jurisdiction is sustained as arising under an Indian
treaty and thus is within "the exclusive province of federal law." See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 234 36.
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monetary relief for the public utility's flooding of the Kalispel Tribe's
land, which constituted a trespass.1
43
Likewise, tribes have a federal common law cause of action for
damages to protect real property interests from private party
interference. 144 As early as 1850, in Marsh v. Brooks,145 the U.S.
Supreme Court assumed an action for ejectment and remanded a case for
trial based on the issue of interference with Indian possessory rights in
land. 146 Over a century later, two cases from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized actions for damages to protect
tribal lands from private parties.'14 In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett
Floral Co.,148 the court sustained claims for ejectment and recovery of
monetary relief against a private party that harvested timber on
reservation land. 149  Similarly, in Pueblo of Isleta v. Universal
Constructors, Inc., 150 the Tenth Circuit considered a treaty-based
damages claim for injury to property resulting from nearby blasting
activities of a private company. 1 5 1 Rejecting the private defendant's
argument that tribes could not base a claim on land title held in trust by
another, 1 52 the Pueblo court reasoned that it was "not appropriate to
bring into play subtle principles of English common law" to overlay a
treaty right which stands uniquely apart from such constraints.
15 3
Instead, as the Pueblo of Isleta court summarized, tribes are entitled to
damages against a private party given the difficulty for individual tribal
members to assert their rights in court, the property interests held in
common by the Tribe, and the strong interest of the United States to
ensure that the Tribe and its members receive "even-handed justice.
143. Pend Oreille, 28 F.3d at 1549 52.
144. See Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. 223, 232 (1850).
145. 49 U.S. 223 (1850).
146. Id. at 232 (citing Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)).
147. See Pueblo of Isleta v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 570 F.2d 300, 301 02 (10th Cir. 1978);
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Co., 503 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1974).
148. 503 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1974).
149. Id. at 338.
150. 570 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1978).
151. Id. at 302-03.
152. Id. at 302 ("The United States is actually the title owner.").
153. Id. at 301 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 677 (1974)); see
also Mescalero, 503 F.2d at 338 (citing Oneida to protect a broad set of property interests under
treaty in federal court, which included an action for damages against a trespasser).
154. Pueblo ofIsleta, 570 F.2d at 302 03.
1197
Washington Law Review
D. Courts Award Monetary Relief to Commercial Fishers at Common
Law
The case law awarding monetary relief to tribes for interference with
certain treaty rights is consistent with the remedies secured by fishers at
common law. 155 Although ownership over wildlife does not arise until
the creature is reduced to capture, 156 a fisher need not "own" fish in
order to assert a compensable legal interest therein.' 57 For example, in
Columbia River Fishermen v. City of St. Helens,158 the Oregon State
Supreme Court awarded damages to commercial fishermen where a
town and a paper mill polluted river waters, which interfered with the
commercial catch. 159 The claim was not one based on ownership of the
fish, but rather involved a claim to protect the right of fishermen to
pursue their vocation.16  In turn, this common-law right of fishers
imposes a corollary duty on others to avoid imperiling fish populations;
such interference presents a cause of action for damages in trespass,
negligence, or nuisance.
161
In short, federal courts grant injunctive relief to halt government and
private projects that, if constructed, would limit a tribe's treaty fishing
right.162 As an independent source of federal law, courts require treaty
compliance notwithstanding a project's conformity with state and other
federal laws. 163 In addition to injunctive relief, federal courts award
monetary relief to tribes where the federal government interferes with a
155. See Columbia River Fishermen v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195, 197 98 (Or. 1939); Bales
v. City of Tacoma, 172 Wash. 494, 498 504, 20 P.2d 860, 863-64 (1933); see also Sanders, supra
note 42, at 166 nn.79 83 (discussing the history of cases illustrating the common law cause of
action for damages for injury caused by interruption or interference with a person's fishing rights).
It should be noted, however, that harm to the treaty right is distinct from harm to commercial fishers
at common law where the right to fish is held by the Tribe on behalf of its members, not individuals.
See Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658, 661 63 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (holding that a $15 million
payment to Tribe for abrogation of treaty fishing rights included compensation of individual
Indians).
156. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y.
1805).
157. See St. Helens, 87 P.2d at 197 98; see also Geer, 161 U.S. at 529 (affirming the state
"ownership" doctrine to regulate wildlife within borders).
158. 87 P.2d 195 (Or. 1939).
159. Id. at 196 97.
160. Id.
161. Sanders, supra note 42, at 166 nn.80 81.
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See supra notes 114 122 and accompanying text.
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treaty fishing right. 164 Likewise, federal courts award monetary relief for
interference with other rights reserved under treaty, regardless of the
defendant actor. 165 Finally, commercial fishers may secure damages at
common law for interference with their vocational rights. 1
66
III. IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, COURTS HAVE REJECTED
TRIBAL FISH DAMAGE CLAIMS AGAINST PRIVATE
PARTIES
With reservations in the shadow of hydroelectric dams, the Nez Perce
and Skokomish Tribes each brought damage claims in federal court for
past harms to their respective treaty fishing rights, which resulted from
dam operations. 16  Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), Congress
exempts the United States from liability for any harm that results from
dam operation and construction, 16 leaving power companies alone to
compensate for downstream harms. 169 The Ninth Circuit granted a
rehearing en bane in Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States 1 0 in
February 2004 to consider the question of whether tribes have a cause of
action for damages in trespass where a private company has interfered
with their treaty right to fish.''7
A. Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co.
In the first case of its kind, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Idaho in Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co.' 2 found jurisdiction to
hear a tribe's treaty claim for damages for the reduction in number of
fish and access to customary stations caused by a private company's
164. See supra Part II.B.
165. See supra Part II.C.
166. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
167. See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1179 (W.D. Wash.
2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part by 332 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2003), and vacated by 358 F.3d 1180
(9th Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc); Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791,
794 (D. Idaho 1994).
168. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(c) (2000). Whether the federal government, in the first instance, can
delegate away its trust obligation to tribes is beyond the scope of this Comment.
169. See Skokomish, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (dismissing claim against a federal defendant).
170. 161 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part by 332 F.3d 551 (9th
Cir. 2003), and vacated by 358 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc).
171. Id. As of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has not yet published its en banc decision.
172. 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994).
1199
Washington Law Review
dam construction and operation.' 3 Adopting the magistrate judge's
report to stand in for its own, the court reasoned that the FPA, under
which the federal government licensed the dam, did not preempt the
treaty-based claim where the available administrative process could not
grant damage awards, but could only impose future mitigation measures
on the dam license. 174 The court denied that the Tribe has a right to
preservation of fish runs as they stood at the 1855 treaty signing.
175
Thus, the court reasoned that the Tribe has no modern-day right on
which to base a claim for monetary relief.176 The tribe, however, prayed
for monetary relief based on harm caused by construction and operation
of the dam since 1955.177 Despite acknowledging the protection afforded
to fishing rights in Winans, Umatilla, and Fishing Vessel, the Nez Perce
court nevertheless denied damages on the grounds that injunctive relief
awarded in prior cases could be distinguished from the monetary relief
sought by the Nez Perce tribe. 178 The court, via the magistrate, cited no
authority for this proposition. 179 Notably, monetary relief is the default
remedy at common law; injunctive relief is granted only where the
plaintiff shows that damages are inadequate at law. 80
Notwithstanding the Oneida Court's expansive reading of a tribal
cause of action, the Nez Perce court reasoned that the Tribe could not
sustain a claim for damages based on its treaty fishing right.' 8 ' The court
reasoned that the right to take fish was not plainly a "property interest"
because the Tribe lacked ownership over "the fish runs themselves."'
182
173. Id. at 794, 799. The court stated that federal question jurisdiction existed, as "it is beyond
any reasonable dispute that the Tribe's fishing rights and their claims in this regard are derived from
the 1855 treaty." Id. at 799 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 676 78 (1974)). Indeed, federal jurisdiction over tribal claims is expressly
provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1362. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 472 (1976) (stating that the act was intended "to open the federal courts
to the kind of claims that could have been brought by the United States as trustee, but for whatever
reason, were not so brought").
174. Nez Perce, 847 F. Supp. at 803.
175. Id. at 807.
176. Id. at 807 13.
177. Id. at 794, 812.
178. Id. at 809.
179. See id. at 806-10.
180. See, e.g., Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 553 (Alaska 1983) (holding that injunctive relief
is proper where damages are inadequate) (citing Coffman v. Breeze Corps., 323 U.S. 316, 322
(1945)).
181. NezPerce, 847 F. Supp. at 807 13.
182. Id.
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In a lengthy footnote, the court noted that if the Tribe had a property
interest in the fish, the Tribe would have a cause of action against "any
private party who intentionally or negligently injured the fish.' 8 3
Because the U.S. Supreme Court in Menominee held that, indeed, fishing
rights are property rights entitled to just compensation, the Nez Perce
court then necessarily distinguished its holding, which denied monetary
relief.'8 4 The district court distinguished compensation for action taken
by Congress to "deprive" a tribe of its fishing rights from a "reduction"
of that same resource caused by a dam. 8 5 Having thus characterized the
case, the court applied institutional capacity arguments and cited
disfavor for judicial activism to support its refusal to grant a "new"
common law cause of action. 8 6 Ultimately, the Nez Perce Tribe secured
a multi-million dollar settlement from Idaho Power.'
87
B. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States
Although the courts sustained jurisdiction in Nez Perce and Oneida
for claims arising under treaty, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington dismissed all treaty-based claims in Skokomish
Indian Tribe v. United States.'88 As the Nez Perce Tribe did, 8 9 the
Skokomish Tribe sued for damages to its treaty fishing right caused by
an upstream hydroelectric project, which for eighty years had nearly
eliminated the stream flow both on- and off-reservation. 90 The district
court dismissed the pleaded claims arising under treaty, after concluding
that the claims sounded in state common law or arose from the Tribe's
objection to the facility license.' 9 ' The FPA, however, dictates the
contours of the dam license and carries no private cause of action.
92
Considering state common law claims, the court reasoned that harm to
the fish runs did not pose a continuing injury, but a permanent and long-
183. Id. at 810 n.22.
184. Id. at 811 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 815.
187. See Judgment for Settlement Agreement, No. CIV.91-00517-S-HLR (D. Idaho Mar. 21,
1997).
188. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
189. Nez Perce, 847 F. Supp. at 794.
190. Skokomish, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
191. Id. at 1179 80.
192. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a 823c (2000); Skokomish, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 80.
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standing one; thus, the statutes of limitations foreclosed any remaining
claims. 193 The court did not discuss the continuing harm to the treaty
right itself as defeating a state time bar.
194
IV. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD AWARD DAMAGES WHERE
PRIVATE PARTIES IMPAIR A TREATY FISHING RIGHT
The treaty right to take a fair portion of available fish, together with
the right of access, ensures that tribes have actual fish to harvest. 195 The
use of injunctions to protect the treaty right before projects destroy fish
runs indicates that monetary relief is necessary to make the tribe whole
after the harmful action is taken. 196 Such a remedy is consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court's characterization of the treaty fishing right as a
compensable property interest, 19 7  with precedent that awards
compensation for interference with other treaty rights,'98 and with
common law claims available to commercial fishers. 199
A. The Right to Take Fish from Historic Fishing Stations Assumes
that There Are Actual Fish to Take.
Only in-the-flesh, actual fish can fulfill a tribe's reserved right to take
a fair portion of fish. 20 0 The Fishing Vessel and Winans Courts both
rejected attempts to reduce the fishing right to abstraction in the face of
193. Skokomish, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 83. In contrast, in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians v. Minnesota, 853 F. Supp. 1118, 1124 25 (D. Minn. 1994), aff'd, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir.
1997), and aff'd, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), the court declined to borrow a state statute of limitations
where the Band asserted a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief directly under a treaty fishing
right. Id. Instead, because the State of Minnesota continued to enforce natural resource regulations
against the Band, a wrong to their fishing and hunting rights was likely "continuing," and thus the
limitations period for the treaty claim had not expired. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1262 (1988), which
conferred original jurisdiction over Indian treaty claims).
194. See Skokomish, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 83.
195. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676 79 (1979); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382
(1905); see also Northwest Res. Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371,
1376 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The Court [in Fishing Vessel] also noted that the treaty guarantee of 'the
right of taking fish' was meaningful only if fish were available for the taking." (emphasis in
original)).
196. See infra notes 213 216 and accompanying text.
197. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
198. See supra Part II.C.
199. See Columbia River Fishermen v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195, 196 (Or. 1939).
200. See supra Part I.B.
1202
Vol. 79:1181, 2004
Private Party Liability Under Indian Treaties
competition from nontreaty fishers. 20 1 The rights of access and fair
apportionment work in tandem to ensure that tribal fishermen have
actual fish to harvest in order to sustain a moderate livelihood.2 2
Guaranteeing access to fishing stations is the means to ensure the end of
securing steady supplies of fish.20 3 In both Fishing Vessel and Winans,
the Court contemplated actual numbers of fish for the tribal taking.20 4
Although the Fishing Vessel Court declined to specify a bare number of
fish beyond a fifty-percent ceiling,20 5 presumably, where the Tribal
harvest was at the time two percent of the total, the numbers spoke for
themselves. The court reserved the future possibility of adjusting the
206percentage if needed to protect ceremonial and subsistence values,
which further supports the conclusion that the treaties guarantee the right
to take actual fish.
On the shoulders of Winans, federal courts should enforce the full
extent of fishing rights-regardless of the defendant actor.20  Indeed,
whether a treaty fishing right binds any particular party relates to the
scope of the right. 20 8 Federal courts are bound by U.S. Supreme Court
precedent to broadly interpret the extent of the right, according to
canons of construction which uniquely favor Tribal interests.2 9 Since
the Winans decision a century ago, private parties are unquestionably
210subject to Indian treaties. More recently, federal courts have held that
no party is authorized to limit a treaty fishing right without
congressional authorization. 21 1 The district courts in Sea Farms,
201. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 678 79 (1979); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,
382, 384 (1905).
202. See supra notes 53 63 and accompanying text; see also Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp.
1504, 1506 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (citing dollar estimates of the potential loss of harvestable fish).
203. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676 78.
204. See id. at 676 79; Winans, 198 U.S. at 382; see also Northwest Res. Info. Ctr. v. Northwest
Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1376 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The Court [in Fishing Vessel]
also noted that the treaty guarantee of 'the right of taking fish' was meaningful only if fish were
available for the taking." (emphasis in original)).
205. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685 86.
206. Id. at 688.
207. See supra Part I.B (discussing the enforcement of easements (one element of fishing rights)
against the government and private parties).
208. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676 77.
209. See id. at 676; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431 32 (1943).
210. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 84 (1905).
211. See Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp.
1515, 1522 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (W.D. Wash. 1988);
No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 372 (W.D. Wash. 1981); Confederated Tribes of Umatilla
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Muckleshoot, No Oilport!, and Umatilla uniformly granted injunctive or
declaratory relief to protect treaty fishing rights against government
agencies, private actors, and their regulatory counterparts.
21 2
Courts should construe the right to access and take actual fish as
equivalent to a tribe's full, fair portion of the harvest taken from historic
213fishing grounds prior to project construction. As the Umatilla,
Muckleshoot, and Sea Farms decisions indicate, the fact that a project
allows a tribe to take some of the available salmon or to access some of
the fishing stations does not satisfy the treaty right; rather, injunctive
relief is proper for any limitation on the right.21 4 Courts also have
enjoined projects that require more money and time for a tribe to catch
even "the same number of fish, 2 15 or projects such as the private
11216pipeline in No Oilport! that affect the "size or quality of the run.
Most notably, the Muckleshoot court considered the Tribe's estimated
financial loss should the private project proceed.2' Even though the
opposing parties had different dollar estimates,218 the fact that the court
considered the Tribe's monetary losses indicates that courts consider a
tribe's right to the pre-project fair harvest of fish.219
Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553, 555 56 (D. Or. 1977).
212. See Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1522; Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1517; No Oilport!, 520
F. Supp. at 372; Umatilla, 440 F. Supp. at 555 56.
213. See Umatilla, 440 F. Supp. at 555. Courts would likely consider only the loss attributed to
the proposed project. See Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1506 (citing dollar estimates of the potential
loss of harvestable fish). This is consistent with the steps to bring "fish damage claims" outlined in a
United States Department of the Interior memorandum. Memorandum from the Associate Solicitor,
Indian Affairs, to Solicitor 1 (May 25, 1982). The memo outlined potential claims that the
Department considered bringing on behalf of tribes against hydroelectric dam operators, elements of
which included: (a) reasonably specific proof of the fishery prior to construction of the dam; (b)
proof that the dam caused the loss of fish; and (c) a determination of the loss suffered. Id. The
United States declined to pursue any such claims. Id. at 1, 30.
214. See Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1522; Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1515; Umatilla, 440 F.
Supp. at 555 56; see also United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 650 (9th Cir. 1998)
(reversing trial court decision where the lower court had improperly limited the treaty scope in
determining the remedy).
215. Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1515 (emphasis added).
216. No Oilport!, 520 F. Supp. at 372 (quoting United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187,
208 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982)). To be sure, the
No Oilport! court relied in part on the portion of the opinion in United States v. Washington later
vacated by the Ninth Circuit; however, the No Oilport! court first cited Fishing Vessel to support the
conclusion that a project threatening a tribe's moderate standard of living must be adjudicated to
ensure that a tribe's fishing right is not limited by a unilateral private action. Id.
217. Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1506.
218. Id.
219. See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. United States, 43 Indian Cl. Comm'n
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B. Monetary Relief Is Required to Make the Tribe Whole when Any
Party Interferes with the Right to Take Actual Fish
Given that both government and private parties are subject to
220treaties, courts that impose monetary penalties against one defendant
actor and not the other unlawfully limit the scope of the treaty right.
Despite U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Menominee and the Indian
Claims Commission's decision in Colville, which construe the treaty
fishing right as compensable property,2 2' the court in Nez Perce
distinguished the elimination of tribal harvest by the federal government
222from that by a private party's project and denied damages. Rather than
discussing the extent of the legal right harmed, the Nez Perce court
expressed concern over imposing a remedy that threatened to return
Idaho to nineteenth-century conditions. 2 The tribe, however, did not
claim a right to catch pre-industrialization levels of fish, but rather
prayed for monetary relief for the decline in fish runs, which was
proximately caused by construction and operation of the dam since
1955.224 Not only did the Nez Perce court mischaracterize the claim, it
also restricted the treaty right in prescribing the appropriate remedy.225
Courts can, at best, adjust the magnitude of the award as justice requires,
but they are not at liberty to limit the scope of the right itself.226 To do
otherwise is reversible error 227 because Congress alone has the authority
to alter treaty terms.22 8 Said another way, if treaty rights are exempted
505, 541 (1978). Note that the number of fish prior to project implementation is merely a
characterization of the right, not necessarily the scope of the harm caused by a defendant project.
Assuredly, the tribe would still have to prove that the project proximately caused the fish decline.
See Memorandum from the Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Solicitor 1 (May 25, 1982).
220. See supra Part I.C.
221. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); Colville, 43
Indian Cl. Comm'n at 541.
222. Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791, 811 12 (D. Idaho 1994); see also
Sanders, supra note 42, at 162 63 (arguing that the Nez Perce fishing right, as a property interest, is
enforceable against all parties).
223. Nez Perce, 847 F. Supp. at 808-09.
224. Id. at 794.
225. See id. at 811 12 (discussing the scope of the right under the heading, "Award of Monetary
Damages").
226. See United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 650 (9th Cir. 1998); Cree v. Waterbury, 78
F.3d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996).
227. See Washington, 157 F.3d at 650; Cree, 78 F.3d at 1405.
228. See supra Part I.C.
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from traditional common law remedies, Congress has yet to say so.229
Indeed, Congress has affirmatively opened federal courthouse doors to
tribes asserting claims arising under treaty.230
The emphasis on the extent of the legal right harmed rather than the
identity of the defendant actor is consistent with the federal judiciary's
across-the-board grant of monetary relief for interference with other
treaty rights.231 For treaty-guaranteed land, federal courts have sustained
federal question jurisdiction and applied federal common law causes of
action to compensate tribes for interference with tribal possessory rights
232at the hands of both private and government parties. Damages are the
appropriate remedy either as one-time compensation for Congress's full
abrogation of the treaty right,233 or for harm proximately caused by a
private defendant, as with blasting activities in Pueblo of Isleta,234 or for
a county's unlawful possession, as in Oneida.235 Awarding damages to
tribes for private party interference with fishing rights, as the Court did
in Menominee for federal party interference, is consistent with the rights-
236focused rationale in the treaty land context. In addition, given the
237
essential role of fishing rights to treaty negotiations, courts should
consider fish claims arising under treaty as analogous to land claims,
which arise under the very same legal instrument. 238 Even if, as in Nez
Perce, a court fails to construe the fishing right as property, courts
229. Courts have long sustained common law causes of action for treaty interference. See supra
notes 144 154 and accompanying text. Congress has yet to expressly legislate to limit such causes
of action.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000); see also Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 472 (1976) (stating the act was intended "to open the federal
courts to the kind of claims that could have been brought by the United States as trustee, but for
whatever reason, were not so brought").
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Part II.C.
233. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 98 (1937); United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111 12 (1935).
234. Pueblo of Isleta v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 570 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1978).
235. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 229 (1985).
236. See supra Part II.B (discussing cases awarding monetary relief against both government and
private parties).
237. See supra Part I.A.
238. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 853 F. Supp. 1118, 1124 25 (D.
Minn. 1994) (borrowing the rationale used in the Oneida land title case as relevant in the fishing
rights context) (citing Oneida, 470 U.S. at 240), aff'd, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997), and aff'd, 526
U.S. 172 (1999).
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should compensate tribal fishers' like other non-Indian fishers.239
Indeed, under a common law claim by fishers, it is not necessary that
tribes even "own" fish to assert a right upon which relief may be
granted. 240 The St. Helens court based remedies to fishers solely on the
right of vocation, regardless of ownership over the resource.241
Additionally, as in St. Helens, remedies may attach to the fishers'
asserted rights not only for "a current supply of salmon," but also for the
"future supply of salmon" diminished by the private action.2 42 Remedies
available to tribes should be, at the very least, equivalent to those
243
available to commercial fishers, particularly given that tribes' fishing
rights are secured in enforceable, written legal instruments and contain
rights broader than those tied to vocation. 244 Thus, for example, even if
the citizen suit provisions available under the Clean Water Act and
Endangered Species Act preempt a St. Helens cause of action,24 5 federal
treaties remain the supreme law of the land unless expressly altered by
Congress.24 6
V. CONCLUSION
In Winans, the U.S. Supreme Court warned that nothing less than the
word of the nation stands behind a tribe's reserved treaty right to fish.
247
Tribes ceded millions of acres of land, contingent upon continued access
to actual fish as necessary to support a livelihood, common sustenance,
and ceremonial values. 24' It is not enough, then, that private projects
239. Columbia River Fishermen v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195, 196 (Or. 1939); Sanders,
supra note 42, at 164.
240. See St. Helens, 87 P.2d at 196; Sanders, supra note 42, at 164; see also Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 677 (1974) (rejecting the argument that the Tribes must
base their claim of possession on actual title); Pueblo of Isleta v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 570
F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1978) (rejecting defendant's arguments based on Anglo-American private
property constructs).
241. St. Helens, 87 P.2d at 196.
242. Id. at 196, 199 (noting the past harm to fishing rights as well as the thousands of dollars that
would be lost in the future).
243. See Sanders, supra note 42, at 164 (arguing that the Nez Perce court's reasoning not only
makes the Tribe's rights inferior to commercial fishers, but would preclude even common law
claims).
244. See supra Part I.A.
245. See supra note 113 (discussing preemption by treaty).
246. See supra notes 101, 114 122 and accompanying text.
247. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
248. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979).
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operate under a compendium of state and federal regulations. Without
express congressional authorization, treaties that long-precede such
permitting schemes require a private party's compliance. 249 Given that
federal courts have enforced the treaty fishing right against private and
government parties alike, courts should award damages against private
actors just as they grant monetary relief for claims of past harms by
government parties.
249. Winans, 198 U.S. at 382.
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